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For many patients, living donor liver transplantation represents their only hope of receiving a lifesaving graft. In certain
(albeit rare) cases, a minor will be the only suitable donor. Living liver donation by minors has been reported in several
countries. In the academic literature and professional guidelines, little attention is paid to the development of an ethical
framework for this practice. The focus is frequently limited to the donation of regenerative tissues and kidneys. However,
liver donation differs in important respects because of the increased medical risks and the lack of substitute therapies.
Therefore, in this article, we assess whether living liver donation by minors is ethically appropriate. We argue that living liver
donation by minors is justifiable only if minors possess the capacity to consent to donation or if the procedure is in their
best interests. Although minors may possess adult-like levels of cognitive maturity, they lack sufficient psychosocial maturity
to give valid consent to donation. In addition, living liver donation is generally not in a minor’s best interests. With respect to
the latter, the potential psychological benefits that a minor may experience as a result of living liver donation are insuffi-
ciently empirically supported and are unlikely to outweigh the short- and long-term medical and psychological risks. There-
fore, we conclude that minors should not be considered as potential living liver donors. Liver Transpl 19:649–655, 2013.
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Living donor liver transplantation was successfully
introduced in 1989 as a response to the exceptionally
high waiting-list mortality rate for small children.1
Soon, the procedure was expanded to large adoles-
cents and adults, and it has since become a wide-
spread medical treatment for end-stage liver disease
and genetic metabolic disorders. However, living liver
donation involves a very complicated surgical proce-
dure with a significant risk of mortality and morbidity.
In the absence of worldwide registration and manda-
tory reporting, the exact estimation of donor mortality
is extremely difficult. According to the most frequently
cited estimates, mortality approaches 0.1% for left
lobe donation and 0.5% for right lobe donation.2-4 As
a result of widely diverging definitions, the incidence
of donor morbidity is also of uncertain magnitude.5,6
Apart from the risk of general anesthesia, potentially
serious morbidities include surgical site infections,
biliary complications, portal vein thrombosis, intra-
abdominal bleeding, pulmonary emboli, and incisional
hernias. Studies focusing on such serious complica-
tions report an overall incidence rate of 15% to
20%.3,5,7-9
With these risks, the enormous benefit to the recipi-
ent is presumably the reason that living donor liver
transplantation is still being performed. Obtaining an
organ from a living donor may be the last resort for
patients suffering from life-threatening liver disease.
The need for liver transplantation is often more urgent
than the need for kidney transplantation because the
annual mortality rate for patients awaiting a liver graft
is almost double that recorded for patients awaiting a
kidney. In addition, liver donation cannot be post-
poned in the same way that kidney donation can be
because there is no substitute treatment similar to
hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis that can sustain
functions until an organ becomes available.10 More-
over, deceased liver donation has its technical limits.
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Admittedly, the practice of reduced size and split graft
liver transplantation has increased the availability of
donor grafts, yet these grafts may not be suitable for
all patients.
Despite the availability of living donor liver trans-
plantation as a lifesaving procedure, only a fairly
small percentage of potential living donors may be
suitable.11 People suffering from common medical
conditions such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes,
and hypertension will be ruled out, and smoking and
obesity may also be considered relative contraindica-
tions to living donation. Sometimes, a minor may be
the only suitable donor, especially in cases of acute
liver failure.12 Although this circumstance is very
rare, living liver donations by minors have been
reported. Specifically, there have been 13 such cases
in the United States.13 Other countries such as Japan
and Brazil have also recorded cases of minor living
liver donors.14,15 When it is deemed to involve accept-
able risks to the health of the donor, living liver dona-
tion by minors is allowed in several other countries
such as Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Moreover, in countries that currently allow minors to
donate only hematopoietic stem cells, a tendency
could be developing to interpret the possibility for
minors to donate regenerative tissue to also include
liver segments or lobes. An indication hereof can be
found in the August 2012 amendment of the Belgian
transplantation law.16 The possibility for minors to
donate regenerative tissue, which had previously been
interpreted as pertaining only to hematopoietic stem
cells, has now been reinterpreted to also refer to liver
segments or lobes. This law allows minors as young
as 12 years to donate to a brother or sister on the
condition that they are capable of expressing their will
and have given prior consent.
In the academic literature and professional guide-
lines, little attention is paid to developing a specific
ethical framework for living liver donation by minors.
The focus is frequently limited to the donation of re-
generative tissues and kidneys. However, because of
the increased medical risks of liver donation and the
lack of substitute therapies, the considerations that
are relevant in this context may differ in important
respects from those pertaining to kidney and regener-
ative tissue donation. Thus, there is an urgent need
for more profound reflection on the ethical aspects of
living liver donation by minors. In this article, we try
to assess whether living liver donation by minors can
be ethically appropriate. We occasionally refer to the
new Belgian law as a starting point for our ethical
reflection.
LIVING LIVER DONATION AND
DECISIONAL CAPACITY
The imposition of risks to the living liver donor may
be warranted when the donor decides that the risks
are worth taking. In other words, a potential living do-
nor has a moral right to accept a considerable health
risk in order to help a patient in need of an organ.17,18
However, the primacy of the donor’s right to donate is
not absolute. Most importantly, the decision to donate
should be an autonomous one, and this implies that
the potential donor demonstrates decisional capacity.
A person possesses this capacity when he or she is
able to comprehend and make a judgment about the
information concerning a medical intervention, to
intend a certain outcome, and to communicate freely
his or her wishes.19
For subjects possessing decisional capacity, their
prior free and informed consent is a necessary
condition of morally permissible living liver donation.
Disclosure, understanding, and voluntariness are
generally recognized as the necessary components of
informed consent.19 The disclosure factor implies that
complete, objective, and intelligible information
should be provided in order to allow the potential liv-
ing liver donor to arrive at a well-reasoned conclusion.
The understanding component requires one to ensure
that the potential donor has an accurate understand-
ing of the purpose and nature of the procedure, the
possible consequences to his or her health and emo-
tional well-being, the expected health impact on the
recipient, and the availability and efficacy of possible
alternative therapies. Finally, the voluntariness ele-
ment requires screening aimed at verifying that poten-
tial living liver donors are not influenced by undue
pressure, deception, or financial incentives.17,18
Except for adults who have been judicially declared
mentally incompetent, the law operates under the re-
buttable presumption that adults are competent to
make their own decisions about living liver donation.
However, even when a person is deemed sufficiently
competent and free and informed consent to donate is
obtained, the autonomy of the potential adult donor is
still bound by legal restrictions and standards of rea-
sonable medical practice. Donation will not be allowed
when the transplant team is of the opinion that the
overall risk-benefit balance of the procedure is clearly
negative or that the absolute level of risk to the donor
is too high. In addition, in most countries, living
liver donation is subject to additional requirements,
such as authorization by an independent body and
restriction to recipients with whom a close personal
relationship exists. These provisions are intended to
prevent undue pressure or improper inducement to
donate.17,18
If we are to determine whether minors should be
allowed to donate a liver lobe, we must ascertain
whether they possess sufficient capacity to make this
decision. Therefore, in the following sections, we take
a closer look at minors’ decision-making capacity.
First, we discuss the (exceptional) circumstances
under which minors are considered legally competent
to make their own health care decisions. Next, we de-
velop a moral framework that provides a means of dis-
tinguishing those health care decisions that minors
(of a certain age) are capable of making from those
that they are incapable of making. Finally, we apply
this moral framework to the specific context of living
liver donation.
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ASSESSING MINORS’ COMPETENCE
TO CONSENT TO MEDICAL
INTERVENTIONS
Legal Framework
Minors are legally considered as incompetents lacking
the necessary capacity to make fully informed medical
decisions.20 There is a general, legal presumption that
parents have their children’s best interests at heart.21
Parents, therefore, are granted the right to make
health care decisions on their minor children’s behalf.
The requirement for parental consent in the medical
care of minors is subject to 4 possible exceptions.
First, in emergency situations, when there is no time
to obtain parental consent, medical personnel are
allowed to treat a minor. The rationale behind this
exception is the idea that parents, if present, would
consent to treatment. In addition, the emergency excep-
tion serves to protect the physician from liability.22
Second, minors who are emancipated by marriage
or other circumstances have the right to make deci-
sions on their own behalf.
Third, many jurisdictions explicitly authorize minors
to consent to certain specific medical interventions,
such as prenatal care, drug treatment, contraception,
mental health care, and testing and treatment for sex-
ually transmitted diseases. This authorization aims to
encourage minors to seek care that, under a parental
consent requirement, might not be sought for fear of
parental punishment. As such, this third exception
primarily constitutes a protective measure for
minors.20
A final exception to the parental consent require-
ment is the mature minor doctrine. This permits a
minor to consent to or refuse treatment if he or she
has the capacity to understand the nature and conse-
quences of the medical decision at hand. Many coun-
tries appear to have adopted a mature minor doctrine
of some sort.23,24 In the United States, however, only
a few states have enacted statutes allowing mature
minors to consent to their own medical treatment.22
In assessing a minor’s level of maturity, courts take
into account the nature and gravity of the treatment.
Adolescents are generally found competent to consent
to or refuse low-risk procedures (eg, tonsillectomies,
vaccinations, and treatments for back pain), whereas
they are seldom deemed sufficiently mature to con-
sent to high-risk or life-altering procedures (eg, sex
reassignment and sterilization).24 Moreover, with the
exception of blood donation, courts do not generally
sanction adolescent consent to nontherapeutic proce-
dures benefiting a third party, such as skin graft don-
ations.25 Courts vary with respect to the standard of
proof used for determining maturity. Some have
favored a case-by-case approach. Others have applied
the rule of sevens, a standard derived from English
common law. Under this rule, children under the age
of 7 years do not have the capacity to consent, chil-
dren who are 7 to 14 years old are presumed not to
have this capacity (until proven otherwise in
individual cases), and children over age 14 are pre-
sumed to have the capacity to make their own deci-
sions (unless proven otherwise).26
Moral Framework
According to Steinberg and Scott,27 when we discuss
decisional capacity, we should distinguish cognitive
maturity from its psychosocial counterpart. Studies
suggest that adolescents beyond the age of 14 years
demonstrate a level of cognitive maturity similar to
that of adults; that is, they possess adult-like capaci-
ties for logical reasoning about moral, social, and
interpersonal matters. For example, a study by Wei-
thorn and Campbell28 showed that 14-year-olds did
not differ significantly from 18- and 21-year-old
adults with respect to their ability to reason or under-
stand treatment information presented to them in
medical dilemmas. Subsequent research into the de-
velopment of cognitive capacities found similarly high
levels of adolescent maturity (eg, Hale29 and Belter
and Grisso30). Those who advocate granting adoles-
cents a higher degree of self-determination in medical
decision making often cite this type of research. The
American Psychological Association, for example, has
argued for a recognition of adolescents’ right to con-
sent to abortion on the basis of their having decision-
making skills comparable to those of adults.31
Although adolescents display cognitive capacities
that come close to those of adults, they do not yet ex-
hibit adult-like levels of psychosocial maturity. There
are 4 psychosocial factors that are specifically rele-
vant to decision-making outcomes.31
The first factor is susceptibility to social coercion.
Research supports the common-sense view that ado-
lescents are more susceptible to coercive influences
than adults.32 In some contexts, adolescents’ choices
are made in response to direct peer pressure. How-
ever, adolescents’ desire for peer approval or fear of
rejection may also affect their choices indirectly (ie, in
the absence of direct coercion).
Risk perception constitutes the second psychosocial
factor. In comparison with adults, adolescents place
less weight on risk in relation to reward.33 They often
consider themselves invulnerable to harm.25 This fac-
tor, for example, explains why adolescents engage in
unprotected sex more often than adults. The fact that
adolescents demonstrate adult-like cognitive capaci-
ties implies that they are fully aware of and under-
stand the potential risks involved. However, as a
result of their distorted risk-reward calculus, they see
the potential benefits of unprotected sex as outweigh-
ing the potential risks.34
The third psychosocial factor is known as future ori-
entation, which refers to the extent to which one
anticipates future consequences. Adolescents tend to
focus mainly on the short-term consequences—both
risks and benefits—of their choices, whereas adults
also take into account long-term impacts (eg, Hal-
pern-Felsher and Cauffman35). The limited life experi-
ence of adolescents may account for their greater
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inclination to discount the future: a result 10 years
away from now is likely to appear more remote the
shorter one’s experienced lifespan is.36
The final psychosocial factor relates to impulsivity.
Research indicates that adolescents are prone to more
extreme mood swings and have more difficulty in con-
trolling their impulses and behavior (eg, Farrington37).
The distinction between cognitive and psychosocial
maturity provides us with a standard for identifying
the type of decision to which the mature minor doc-
trine should be held applicable. In sum, it tells us
which decisions we may allow adolescents to consent
to or refuse. The established cognitive maturity of
adolescents suggests that we should regard them as
having sufficient decisional capacity to make health
care decisions that are generally not strongly influ-
enced by any of the aforementioned psychosocial fac-
tors. By contrast, their psychosocial immaturity
implies that we ought to consider them as lacking the
decisional capacity to make health care decisions with
a strong psychosocial component, that is, decisions
typically eliciting impulsivity and involving high levels
of social coercion or significant immediate risks/long-
term consequences. Note that it will not always be
clear-cut whether one is dealing with a health care
decision of the former or latter type.
One might argue that our approach is problematic
in that it is based on findings of (in)sufficient deci-
sional capacity in the average adolescent and thereby
ignores possible deviations from the average. Admit-
tedly, our approach runs the risk of assuming cogni-
tive maturity where there is none and vice versa for
psychosocial maturity. However, we currently lack the
instruments to reliably assess maturity on an individ-
ualized basis.38 In the absence of such instruments, it
seems unproblematic to presume that sufficient deci-
sional capacity is present in the case of health care
decisions in which psychosocial factors are not
strongly at play. The latter, after all, tend to be low-
risk decisions. In the same vein, the typically high-
risk nature of health care decisions with a strong psy-
chosocial component suggests that in such cases we
would do well to err on the side of insufficient deci-
sional capacity.
ASSESSING MINORS’ CAPACITY TO
CONSENT TO LIVING LIVER DONATION
If we are to determine whether we should consider
adolescents as having the capacity to consent to living
liver donation, we must identify the type of decision-
making process involved. Therefore, this section will
examine for each of the psychosocial factors the
extent to which they are relevant to the context of liv-
ing liver donation by minors.
With respect to susceptibility to social coercion, it
should be noted that the context of living donation
exhibits certain features that increase the chances of
coercive pressures occurring. One such feature is that
donation typically takes place between family mem-
bers. In the case of living liver donation, there is the
added element of the lack of any substitute therapy.
Parents, regardless of whether they themselves or one
of their children is in need of a liver, may pressurize
their minor child into donation. The minor is likely to
succumb to such pressure because he or she is
socially dependent on his or her parents. If the candi-
date recipient is a sibling, the latter may exert an
additional source of coercion, especially if he or she is
an adult.
The psychosocial factor of risk perception is also
highly relevant to the context of living liver donation
by minors. As noted earlier, living liver donation
involves a significant risk of mortality and morbidity.
Data concerning morbidity and mortality risks, how-
ever, generally focus on adult donors. Because of the
extremely small number of cases involving minor
donors, very little is known about the risks for this
specific population. Thus, we cannot at present
exclude the possibility of the risks being still higher
for minor donors.
Future orientation, the third psychosocial factor,
also comes into play in living liver donation by
minors. Although the regenerative capacity of the liver
is often invoked as a reason for dismissing the possi-
bility of any significant future health risks to the do-
nor, such dismissal, at present, seems highly
premature. First, living liver donation is too recent a
practice for long-term data to have been established.
Second, although the donor’s liver regains normal
metabolic function within a matter of weeks after don-
ation, it regenerates to only approximately 89% of its
preoperative volume.5,39 Therefore, we cannot exclude
the possibility of the incomplete restoration of the ini-
tial liver volume having serious long-term consequen-
ces.40 Although little is known about the long-term
consequences for adult living liver donors, still less is
known about the more recent (and extremely small-
scale) practice of using minors as living donors. In
any case, however, minors are likely to suffer more
from any adverse long-term effects because they have
a greater number of life years ahead of them.
Most often, impulsivity will not be a salient psycho-
social feature of an adolescent’s decision to consent to
living liver donation. However, in exceptional circum-
stances, impulsivity might come into play. For exam-
ple, if the candidate recipient suffers from acute liver
failure, he or she might have a life expectancy of less
than a week without transplantation.41 Under such
time pressure, there is an increased chance of the
adolescent’s impulses getting the upper hand over de-
liberative, reasoned decision making.
On the basis of this analysis, we may reasonably
conclude that many, if not all, of the psychosocial fac-
tors feature in the living liver donation decision. We
should, therefore, subject this decision to a height-
ened standard of decisional capacity, that is, one
requiring the presence of psychosocial maturity in
addition to cognitive maturity. In demanding such a
high level of decisional capacity, our proposal satisfies
the widely accepted proportionality requirement. The
latter refers to a sliding scale and implies that the
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level of decisional capacity required ought to increase
in accordance with the level of risk involved in the
decision.42
As a result of their psychosocial immaturity, adoles-
cents considering living liver donation run the risk of
yielding to coercive pressures and placing too little
weight on possible immediate and long-term risks.
Moreover, under circumstances requiring expedited
transplantation, adolescents’ decisions are more likely
to be rash rather than well thought out. Adolescents
should, therefore, be considered incapable of consent-
ing to living liver donation. Thus, in presuming that
minors as young as 12 years are able to consent to
such a procedure, the Belgian transplantation law is
far too permissive.
IS LIVING LIVER DONATION IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF MINORS?
Because of a minor’s insufficient decisional capacity
to consent to living liver donation, the harm involved
in such a procedure cannot be justified on the basis
of his or her autonomous decision. However, the
acceptability of living liver donation by minors need
not necessarily be ruled out. As noted earlier, parents
are generally granted the right to make health care
decisions on their minor children’s behalf. Although
this practice of proxy consent is generally undisputed
in cases in which the decision is related to the minor’s
own health, it is less clear whether it should extend to
interventions in minors for the benefit of a third
party.43 In sum, there may still be grounds in the
case of living liver donation to allow parents (or other
surrogate decision makers) to give proxy consent.
Those advocating the right of surrogate decision
makers to consent to living donation on a minor’s
behalf disagree about which party is best suited to act
as a proxy. Although some argue that the proxy deci-
sion should be left to the parents’ discretion, others
believe that parents might have a conflict of interest.
The latter, therefore, recommend transferring the right
of decision making to a judge, the minor’s physician,
or an ethics committee.44
When they are making medical decisions for their
wards, surrogates are bound by certain standards.
There are 2 widely used standards for making deci-
sions on the part of incompetents: the substituted
judgment standard and the best interests standard.
The former standard dictates that the surrogate act in
the way that the patient would if he or she were com-
petent to make the decision. Use of the substituted
judgment standard is restricted to those cases for
which there is reliable evidence about the patient’s
preferences for treatment under the circumstances.44
We inevitably lack such evidence when we are dealing
with patients who have never been competent, such
as minors. The best interests standard governs surro-
gate decision making for this category of incompe-
tents. It requires that the surrogate “determine the
highest net benefit among the available options,
assigning different weights to interests the patient has
in each option and discounting or subtracting inher-
ent risks or costs.”19
As this suggests, the best interest of the incompe-
tent person is the appropriate decision-making stand-
ard in the context of living liver donation by minors.
Thus, if we grant surrogate decision makers the right
to issue proxy consent to donation, their decision
must be based on an analysis of the risks and bene-
fits incurred by the minor donor. However, the ques-
tion remains whether we ought to grant surrogate
decision makers this right. After all, it would be fool-
ish to do so and thus allow living liver donation by
minors if we have ample reason to believe that this
type of donation is generally not in a minor’s best
interests. Therefore, we now proceed to assess
whether living liver donation is generally in a minor’s
best interests.
Although living donor liver transplantation provides
no therapeutic benefit to the donor and carries a high
risk of morbidity and mortality, it can still be in the
donor’s overall best interests if he or she is likely to
expect significant psychological benefits. Living organ
donors have reported heightened self-esteem,
enhanced feelings of autonomy, renewed meaning in
life, and other positive feelings associated with impor-
tant altruistic acts.45,46 Combined with the emotional
benefits that are more immediately derived from pre-
venting the loss of a loved one, these elements may
encourage donation even when considerable health
risks are involved. The same type of risk-benefit cal-
culation has been applied to kidney donation by
minors to family members. It is argued that minors
may already experience the positive effects of altruism
and will clearly benefit from the continued compan-
ionship of the recipient and from growing up in a fam-
ily untouched by tragic loss.47,48
However, this risk-benefit calculation is problematic
when it is applied to minors. For instance, it remains
unclear to what extent minors can indeed experience
these psychological benefits, especially when their cog-
nitive and emotional capacities are still developing.43,49
Furthermore, donation may also have severe negative
psychological effects, such as lower self-esteem, feel-
ings of abuse, a strained relationship with the recipi-
ent, a sense of neglect and lack of appreciation, and,
when transplantation fails, feelings of anger, guilt, and
blame.50,51 Specifically in liver donation, additional
psychological problems have been reported; these
include cosmetic issues due to significant scar forma-
tion, professional matters resulting from the long re-
covery time, anxiety regarding one’s future health,
and, remarkably, a significantly higher rate of psychi-
atric complications.2,9,52-54 Finally, there is yet another
sense in which a living liver donor might experience
adverse psychological effects. Because minors have
generally not yet started families of their own, they
may later in life come to regret their decision to donate.
After all, despite its regenerative capacity, a liver lobe
can be donated only once in a lifetime, and this pre-
empts the opportunity of subsequent donation to peo-
ple with whom a more intimate bond might exist.55
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In view of the high mortality and morbidity risk,
rather speculative psychological benefits, and poten-
tially important psychological risks, we may conclude
that living liver donation is generally not in a minor’s
best interests.
Minor Parent-to-Child Donation: An Exception
to the Rule?
Although living liver donation should not normally be
considered as being in a minor’s best interests, the
possibility of minor parents donating to their own
children requires special consideration. Adult parents
often describe the decision to donate to their own chil-
dren as natural and self-evident and emanating from
the moral imperative to place the interests of their
children before their own. Parents who are not
accepted as suitable living donors for their own chil-
dren often report negative feelings such as disappoint-
ment and anger.56
The same feelings and experiences are also likely to
occur in minor parents. The exceptional nature of the
parent-child relationship suggests that a minor parent
donating to his or her child will most likely experience
a psychological benefit substantial enough to out-
weigh any negative effects. A uniform prohibition on
living liver donation by minors may, therefore, impede
minor parents in exercising what they regard as an
essential part of their parental responsibility. Thus,
minor parent-to-child donation merits consideration
as a possible exception to a blanket prohibition on liv-
ing liver donation by minors. In this respect, it
deserves mentioning that in several US states, a
minor is generally deemed an unacceptable liver do-
nor unless the intended recipient is his or her own
child.57 Donation requests from minor parents would
always require ad hoc consideration. The specifics of
how to deal with such requests, however, lie outside
the scope of this article.
CONCLUSIONS
Living liver donation entails an invasive procedure
with fairly high risks of morbidity and mortality. Don-
ation by minors is acceptable only when the proce-
dure is the result of informed, well-considered, and
autonomous consent by the potential minor donor or
when it is in the minor’s best interests. We have
argued that minors should not be regarded as having
sufficient decisional capacity to consent to living liver
donation. Although adolescents possess sufficient
cognitive maturity, they lack sufficient psychosocial
maturity to resist family pressure and impulsivity and
to fully take into account possible immediate and
long-term risks. In addition, living liver donation by
minors cannot be justified on the basis of the best
interests of the minor because current knowledge
regarding the psychological benefits of living liver don-
ation by minors is inadequate. Moreover, if we pre-
sume that a minor may experience psychological
benefits as a result of living liver donation, these
benefits are unlikely to outweigh the medical and psy-
chological risks and burdens of the procedure. It is
only in the case of a minor parent donating to his or
her child that the benefits are likely to outweigh the
risks. Therefore, we conclude that, with the possible
exception of minor parents donating to their children,
minors should not be considered as potential living
liver donors.
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